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PARDONS AND HABITUAL CaMINAL
STATUTES-CONFLICTS OF CMNAL
LAws.-[Federal] A pardon does
not have the effect of mullifying a
conviction of crime so far as habitual
criminal statutes are concerned, according to the holding of the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals in
Groseclose v. Plummer, 106 F. (2d)
311 (C. C. A., 9th, 1939).. The case
came before the court on an appeal
from the United States District
Court in California, which denied
appellant's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. Appellant had been
convicted in California and sentenced to the state's prison as an
habitual criminal. The conviction
had been affirmed by the Appellate
Court (People v. Biggs et al., 65 P.
(2d) 75 (Cal. App., 1937) and by
the Supreme Court of California,
People v. Biggs, 9 Cal. (2d) 508,
71 P. (2d) 214 (1937).
Petitioner contended in the state
courts and in the Federal court that
two of the three felony convictions
on which the finding of habitual
criminality was based were convictions in Texas for which he had
been pardoned by the executive;
further that Texas law did not per-

mit the introduction of evidence for
which a man had been pardoned, in
9ny subsequent proceedings whatsoever. In answer to that contention Circuit Judge Stephens, writing the opinion in the instant case,
said (supra, 313): "It may be true
(we do not so hold) that the Texas
pardon law goes all the way and
prohibits the Texas courts from
giving any consideration to a pardoned offense. Yet such a law
could not turn back the hand of
time long enough to delete an actualit - from its long course. It still
remains true that petitioner was
the subject of two prior final convictions when the law of California
overtook him in the commission of
another felony. Notwithstanding
the Texas pardons, the stubborn
fact remains that the habit of crime
was upon him. The executive clemency of one state could not, under
the law of such a state, prevent a
sister state from taking cognizance
of plain facts, and from applying its
police laws to them." (Italics supplied)
The holding of the California
court in refusing to treat the pardons as a bar to the consideration
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of the two prior convictions was in
line with an earlier decision of the
California District Court of Appeals, People v. Sheridan, 16 Cal.
App. (2d) 476, 60 P. (2d) 870 (1936).
There the court sustained the conviction of a man, convicted as an
habitual criminal, despite prior
California pardons.
Texas, on the other hand, gives a
broad construction to the pardon
and refuses proof of conviction to
be made in any case where the
felon is subsequently pardoned. In
the case of Scrivenor v. State, 113
Tex. Cr. App. 194,20 S. W. (2d) 416
(1928) the court reversed a conviction for a second offense in robbery
because the appellant in that case
had been pardoned by Governor
Miriam Ferguson after the first
conviction, and hence could not be
a second offender. In that case
Judge Lattimore (supra, at 416)
cited 20 R. C. L. §§40,41: "'In case of
full pardon, it relieves the punishment and blots out of existence the
guilt of the offender to such an extent that, in the eyes of the law, he
is as innocent as if he had never
committed the offense,"' and further
observed, ". . . in our judgment the
learned trial court was in error in
allowing proof of the former conviction of this appellant and in permitting the same to be used to secure a greater penalty, when it was
shown that he had been granted a
full pardon therefore."
With the Texas law as stated by
Judge Lattimore, the United States
Courts and the courts of California
were in opposition to the general
proposition of the conflicts of criminal laws, as stated by Professor
Stimson: ".... the law applicable
to aii individual is the law to which
he was subject at the time of the
acts or omissions, the legal effect

of which are in question, and not
the law of the forum in which his
rights may afterwards be brought
into question." Stimson, Conflicts
of CriminalLaws (1936) 4; cf. Beale
Conflicts of Law (1916) §73. Following this principle, it could be
argued that the California forum
(and the Circuit Court of Appeals)
should have allowed the rule of the
Texas forum to govern, and the
conviction be set aside, since the
defendant's prior convictions were
for acts committed in Texas.
Opposed to this position is the
more realistic approach to the problem of conflicts tacitly adopted by
the court in the instant case, which
holds that when the public policy
of a state is in question, the domestic forum may apply its own
laws. This view is upheld by many
students of conflicts of laws and
finds succinct expression in the
words of Professor W. W. Cook (40
W. Va. L. Q. 303 (1934) at p. 328):
"If, on the other hand, the emphasis
is shifted primarily to the prevention of conduct regarded in the
given state as anti-social, and if, in
connection with this, the segregation of the offender is regarded in
large part from the point of view
of reclaiming the 'criminal,' the
place in which the 'crime is committed' at once comes to assume
less importance. The enforcement
of the criminal becomes to a considerable degree a means of selecting persons in need of remedial
treatment, or of permanent detention where 'cure' is impossible."
Returning to the question of the
effect of pardons in general, a study
of the decisions from other jurisdictions shows a varying attitude.
By means of treaty construction,
the United States District Court
found that one pardoned by the
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King of Prussia could lawfully enter
the United States, Hempel v. Weeden, 23 F. (2d) 949 (D. C. W. D.
Wash., 1928). The court, however,
stated that Congress could disregard the effect of a foreign pardon
wiping out conviction in that state,
and deny admission. The court also
suggested that it would not be
bound to treat all pardons from all
states as it did the one from Prussia.
The states in general treat convictions as restoring civil rights but
not privileges or licenses. In Oklahoma, for example, a pardoned
felon was permitted to be a candidate for the legislature, State ex rel
Cloud v. Election Board of State of
Oklahoma, 169 Okla. 363, 36 P. (2d)
20, 94 A. L. R. 1007 (1934). However,
the appellate division of the Supreme Court of New York held that
while civil disabilities were removed by full pardon, the pardoned
person was still a convicted criminal
(Beck v. Finigan, 3 N. Y. S. (2d)
1009, 254 App. Div. 110, aff'g 298
N. Y. S. 675) and upheld the civil
service commission of New York
city in denying a position to one
whose record bore a conviction. In
Georgia a policeman, discharged
from his job by reason of a felony
conviction, felt aggrieved when he
was not restored to his former position upon pardon. The court told
him the pardon restored him to all
civil rights but could not restore
him to office. Morris v. Hartsfield,
186 Ga. 156, 197 S. E. 281 (1938).
The right to practice medicine or
law is in a class of special license
in so far as restoration by pardon
is concerned. Anyone who would
be re-admitted to the practice of
law or even halt disbarment proceedings may not rely solely upon
executive clemency as a grounds
for restoration to his profession.
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In re Egan, 52 S.D. 394, 218 N. W. 1
(1928) ; Commonwealth ex rel Harris
v. Porter, 257 Ky. 563, 78 S.W. (2d)
800 (1935); State v. Snyder, 136
Fla. 875, 187 So. 381 (1939). A
woman convicted of manslaughter
in Washington and subsequently
pardoned was denied the right to
regain her license to practice the
art of healing. State v. Hazzard,
139 Wash. 487, 247 P. 957,47 A. L. R.
538 (1926). The court in that case
answered the suggestion that a
pardon by the governor should be
treated as a finding of innocence,
saying that to ask the court to believe that even a bare majority
were pardoned because they were
innocent was to ask the court "to
assume that which we all know to
be untrue."
It would seem that the Circuit
Court of Appeals took the better
course in denying the appeal to
release Groseclose. The courts are
to be commended when they treat
a pardon as opening the way to rehabilitating a man and permitting
him to resume his place in society.
It is highly offensive to any sense
of social policy to demand that the
court overlook the first offense for
which he has been pardoned when
he is caught later in some rascality.
The gist of the rationale behind
the case is well put by Judge
Stephens, "... a law could not
turn back the hand of time long
enough to delete an actuality from
its long course . . . the habit of
crime was upon him."
Jom L. DAVIDsON, Jr.
PROMISE OF IMMUNITY

PROSECUTIO.-[Ill.]

FROM

Defendants

were indicted for conspiracy to defraud the state of money due it
under Motor Fuel Tax Act. The
state's attorney promised the de-
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fendants immunity from prosecution if they would settle claims
against them. The court approved
this agreement and allowed the
prosecutor to withdraw the indictment with leave to reinstate. The
defendants fulfilled all the terms of
the agreement by paying large
sums in open court and surrendering their license to do business.
Notwithstanding this agreement
the defendants were subsequently
indicted for the same offense and
convicted. On appeal it was held
that the People, having reached an
agreement with defendants, were
bound to live up to it. People v.
Johnson et al, 372 Ill. 18. 22 N. E.
(2d) 683 (1939).
This case appears to increase the
power of the state's attorney in
granting immunity from prosecution in a form binding on the state,
if made with the consent of the
court. This rule derives from and
expands the doctrine established in
the Bogolowski cases. People v.
Bogolowski, 317 Ill. 460, 148 N. E.
260 (1925); id, 326 Ill. 253, 157 N. E.
181 (1927). In these cases, a witness turned state's evidence in consideration for a promise of immunity made by the prosecutor.
Irrespective of this promise, the
witness was subsequently tried
without being permitted to withdraw his original plea of guilty.
On appeal, the Supreme Court
ruled that in such circumstances
the defendant should be allowed to
withdraw his plea. Upon retrial
and conviction, the defendants
again appealed, this time asserting
the promise of immunity as a bar
to prosecution. The court accepted
this view and held that the state's
attorney, having power to grant
immunity, bound the state by his
promise.

The holding in the instant case
sanctions a prosecutor's agreement
with the accused-approved by the
trial court-wherein the latter
promises reparation for the crime
in consideration for a promise not
to prosecute. If the defendant adheres to his agreement he has a
valid defense against a subsequent
trial.
The Illinois legislature has given
to the court the power to grant
immunity to witnesses testifying in
grand jury investigations or at
trial, in cases involving bribery or
attempted bribery of public officials. A prerequisite to the exercise of this power is that the witness be material and the testimony
offered self-incriminatory. [SmithHurd Illinois Ann. Stat., Ill. Rev.
Stats. (1937) c. 38§82. Ch. 38, Sec.
82.] In light of the statutory
principle "expressio unius est
exclusio alterius" it would appear as though the Illinois courts
have assumed a power which the
Legislature has not seen fit to grant
them. That is, since the legislature
has declared that an immunity be
granted in bribery cases, the legislative intent would appear to prohibit these agreements in other
criminal situations. Thus a statutory predicate cannot be found to
justify the holding in the Bogolowski or the instant case; and at
common law, agreements, as involved in the present case, were
not recognized. See Lord Mansfield's opinion in Rex v. Rudd, 1
Cowp. 331 (1775). This doctrine
established by this case presently
obtains in England. 14 Am. Juris.
844, §115.
The procedure here involved is
not to be confused with a nolle
prosse, which in Illinois, is no bar
to a subsequent prosecution. People
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u. M Ginuis, 234 l. 68, 84 N. E. 687
(1908); O'Donnell v. People, 224 Ill.
218, 79 N. E. 639 (1906). The basis
of both the Bogolowski and the instant case is the express promise
not to prosecute; this consideration
is not present in the nolle prosse
cases.
The majority of courts hold that
an immunity agreement, even if
made with the consent of the trial
court, is not binding on the State.
At best, it creates only an equitable
right to executive clemency. Wilson
v. State, 134 Fla. 391, 184 So. 31
(1938); Cortes v. State, 135 Fla. 589,
185 So. 323 (1938); U. S. v. Ford
(whiskey cases), 99 U. S. 594
(1878), Ex ParteIrvine, 74 Fed. 954
(1896); Lowe v. State, 111 Md. 1,
73 At. 637 (1909); State v. Guild,
149 Mo. 370, 50 S. W. 909 (1899).
This is the same view that obtains
in the English courts. 14 Am. Juris.
844, §115. Some states, however,
recognize these agreements as binding if the consent of court is had.
Morrison v. State, 49 Okla. Cr. 369,
294 P. 825 (1931); Camron v. State,
32 Tex. Cr. 180, 22 S. W. 682 (1893);
Dollar v. State, 92 Tex. Cr. 254, 242
S. W. 733 (1922). The Illinois court
in this regard occupies a distinct
position. It holds valid immunity
agreements even if not made with
the consent of the court. People v.
Bogolowski, supra. In the instant
case, the court's consent was had,
but whether such consent would
be a requisite to the validity of an
agreement to make reparations.
still remains a matter of conjecture.
Once again is presented the problem of seeking a balance of equities
on one side and the words of the
statute on the other. Under the
criminal statute, the defendants
should have been fined and imprisoned. However, it seems highly

inequitable to prosecute individuals
who have gone through the hardships that the defendants have in
the situation presented by this case.
It appears as though the Illinois
court was influenced more strongly
by the equities of the defendants,
and consequently, in its desire to
aid them, upheld their agreement
with the state's attorney.
DArN=

G. LEVI.

REcOIMMsATIONS FOR MERCY BY
THE JunY.-[R. 1.] In a prosecution

for "operating an automobile...
so as to endanger life, resulting in
the death of another . . ." the trial
judge told the jury, in response to
a question from the foreman, that
they could recommend mercy if
they found the defendant guilty.
The judge refused to instruct the
jury that he could completely ignore the recommendation if he so
wished. The Supreme Court of
Rhode Island held that it was error
for the judge to fail to instruct the
jury that he could disregard their
recommendation for mercy, but because of the weight of evidence it
was not reversible error. State v.
Ruzzo, 7 A. (2d) 693 (R. I., 1939).
As to the first issue, some jurists
contend that the sole function of
the jury is to determine whether
the accused is guilty or not, and
that any other matter which might
divert their attention from this
function is to be discouraged. State
v. Lunsford, 163 Wash. 199, 300 P.
529 (1931). Under such a theory
some courts have decided that when
a jury returns with a verdict and
also a recommendation for mercy.
the jury is not responding solely
to the issues submitted to it, and
that they must retire, reconsider
the matter and bring in a verdict
in the proper form, i.e., one with-
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out any recommendation for mercy.
State v. Godwin, 138 N. C. 582, 50
S. E. 277 (1905); State v. McKay,
150 N. C. 813, 63 S. E. 1059 (1909);
State v. Potter, 15 Kan. 234 (1875),
23 L. R. A. 725. In this manner, the
jury is to be closely held within
the scope of its duty. People v. Lee,
17 Cal. 76 (1860).
Other jurists have held that,
though a recommendation of mercy
"may be made and need not result
in redeliberation by the, jury, the
trial judge must at least tell the
jury that any such recommendation
on their part can be disregarded by
the judge as so much surplusage
(Commonwealth v. Zec, 262 Pa.
251, 105 Atl. 279 (1918)), and that
failure to tell the jury would be
error. State v. Keruan, 154 Iowa,
672, 135 N. W. 362 (1912); also see
40 L. R. A., N. S., 239.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana
held, in State v. Sweat, 159 La. 769,
106 S. 298 (1925), that a court's statement to the jury that a mercy recommendation would not be binding
on the courtbutthatthe court would
give consideration to such request
in passing sentence, was not erroneous. The court cited no authority
and its holding seems to have been
unique. Moreover, this was decided
before the Code of Criminal Procedure was passed which changed
the common law of Louisiana. That
state now holds that the trial judge
must tell the jury that any recommendation for mercy on their part
can be disregarded by the judge
and if the judge intimates or says
that he will give great weight to
recommendations of the jury it will
be reversible error, for the duty
of determining punishment rests
solely with the judge. State v.
Doucet, 177 La. 63. 147 So. 500
(1933).
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In a number of states statutes
have been passed allowing juries
to recommend mercy with a verdict
of guilty. N. M. Stat. (1929) §1052226; Ga. Code (1933) §27-2501,
26-1302, 26-1304, 27-2302. Some of
these statutes, such as the Georgia
Code, declare that the judge must
inform the jury that they can recommend mercy whether such instruction is requested or not (Johnson v. State, 100 Ga. 78, 25 S. E 940
(1896)) and that although the recommendation is not binding upon
the judge, it nevertheless constitutes a persuasive influence which
might result in mitigating the
penalty to be imposed on the accused. Taylor v. The State, 110 Ga.

150, 35 S. E 161 (1899). Florida has
held that the court, without request,
does not have to inform the jury
that a majority of their number can
recommend the accused to the
mercy of the court where the statute
allows the jury to make such recommendations. Garnerv. State, 28 Fla.

113, 9 So. 835 (1891). The legal rationale for such statutes is that the
jury may well find the accused
guilty, but recommend mercy because of ameliorating circumstances
in the case, or out of sensible
sympathy for the culprit. The purpose of the statutes may well have
been to allow flexibility in the
judicial machinery so that justice
may be more easily obtained.
Unless the common law hai been
changed by statute, by far the best
practice to follow would be to allow
the jury to make no recommendations of mercy whatever. To tell the
jury that they can recommend
mercy might induce a verdict of
guilty from the jurors on less evi-"
dence than they otherwise would
have needed to convict the defendant. State v. Knight, 34 N. M.
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217, 279 P. 947 (1929). A mercy
recommendation, at best. has but a
psychological affect upon a judge,
and very often may mislead a jury
of laymen into believing, erroneously of course, that the recommendation might have some force. It is
more desirable that they concentrate all of their efforts on the sole
issue of guilt or innocence.
Though holding error in the instant case, the court deemed it
unprejudicial, in view of the theory
that no error of court in performing its duty in instructing a jury
can be overlooked or disregarded
unless the error is of such a character that it clearly appears that
the error could not have affected
the verdict of the jury. This is
especially true where the case isn't
close, People v. Fox, 269 Ill. 300, 110
N. E. 26 (1915); see also Moore,
Ill. Cr. Law and Procedure (3rd
ed., 1932) §1394. And where a case
is not close, a recommendation for
mercy does not necessarily show
that there was a doubt in the minds
of the jurors as to the guilt of the
accused. State v. Arata, 56 Wash.
185, 105 Pac. 227 (1909).
On the other hand, in cases
where the evidence is conflicting
or contradictory and where the instructions are inaccurate, a new
tr:al will be granted if there is
enough evidence favorable to the
defendant to raise a reasonable
doubt whether the jury would have
returned such a verdict if properly instructed. Steinmeyer v. People, 95 Ill. 383 (1880); Chambers v.
People, 105 Ill. 409 (1883). Some
courts hold that if a jury asks a
judge whether they can recommend
mercy, that the question is usually
asked only when one or several of
the jurymen are doubtful as to the
accused's guilt and that they would
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only vote for guilty if they could
recommend mercy. For instance.
where a jury was told that they
could recommend mercy for a
prisoner on trial for his life, it
was held that as the jury or some
of them upon recommending mercy,
had agreed upon the instructions of
the court and as they might have
understood that the court had the
power to exercise clemency, it was
prejudicial error to the prisoner.
State v. Matthews, 191 N. C. 378,
131 S. E. 743 (1926).
Failure to instruct the jury correctly should'be reversible error
where the case is an obviously close
one, but where there is a preponderance of evidence against the
defendant and where failure to instruct the jury correctly merely
resulted in a mercy recommendation arising out of sympathy for the
guilty criminal rather than doubt
of his guilt, the verdict should not
be disturbed.
TBE "RicEr' TO A PUBLIC TRIAL.
Defendant was on trial
-[Utah]
for carnally knowing a female between the ages of 13 and 18 years.
After the jury was sworn and the
information xead, including defendant's plea of not guilty, the State
moved to exclude spectators from
the court room. Over defendant's
objection, the court made the following order: "The motion to clear
the court room is granted, and the
motion of the State to invoke the
exclusion rule is likewise granted.
With the exception of all witnesses
the Court at this time orders the
courtroom cleared. Spectators will
please leave the courtroom." It
was apparent from statements and
objections made that the court and
counsel had in mind Sections 20-7-1
and 20-7-2, revised Stat. Utah 1933,
which read:
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Sec. 20-7-1, "The sittings of every
court of justice are public, except
as provided in the next section.
Sec. 20-7-2, "In an action of
divorce, criminal conversation, seduction, rape, or assault to commit
rape, the court may, in its discretion, exlude all persons who are not
directly interested therein, except
jurors, witnesses and officers of the
court; and in any cause the court
may, in its discretion, during the
examination of a witness exclude
any and all other witnesses in the
cause." In passing, the ambiguity
as to the dual meaning of "witness" as used here needs some
clarification. From the context of
the section it appears that witnesses as last used is not synonymous with spectators in the courtroom.
The trial court's conviction of defendant was reversed on the ground
that that part of Sec. 20-7-2 before
the semi-colon applied to civil
actions and the part after the semicolon applied to "all other causes,"
including criminal prosecutions and
limited the court in its exclusion to
any and all other witnesses, not
spectators, in the cause. In addition it is limited to exclusion of
witnesses only during the taking
of testimony from a particular witness. Under this construction the
trial courts order excluding all
spectators throughout the course of
the trial was error and deprived
the defendant of his constitutional
right to have a public trial. State v.
Beckstead, 88 P. (2d) 461, 96 Utah
528 (1939).
This raises the general inquiry
into how far and in what situations
the courts may exercise their discretion to exclude spectators from
the courtroom. The right to a public trial in all criminal cases is
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guaranteed by the 6th Amendment
to the Federal Constitution and by
most, if not all, of the state constitutions. These guarantees, like
others found in the Bill of Rights,
owe their existence to the manifest
abuses prevalent in the English and
colonial courts of that time. In
light of the criticism which has
been leveled against the government, the courts, and many administrative tribunals for the
alleged denial of those rights, the
question of defendants right to
a public trial holds renewed interest. The problem seems to be one
of balancing the conflict between
the court's inherent power to conduct the trial in a manner within
its own discretion against the defendant's guaranteed right. People
v. Hall, 51 App. Div. 57, 64 N. Y.
Supp. 433 (1900). The question has
not often been litigated and a search
of the cases indicate divergent
views which make generalization
difficult.
Since the 6th Amendment to the
Federal Constitution applies only
to offenses against the federal government (Gaines v. State of Washington, 277 U. S. 81 (1928)) the
decisions must depend in each case
upon the particular state constitutions of statutory provisions involved.
Some states, such as
Alabama, Idaho, Montana, Utah
and Wisconsin, for example, have
statutes in addition to constitutional provisions concerning defendant's right to a public trial.
They are generally confined to certain civil actions, different in each
state, and to the sex offenses of
rape or assault with intent to commit rape. In one instance, Wisconsin, the court's discretion is
limited to the exclusion of minors
during the conduct of such trials.
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These statutes give the court a wide
range of discretion and seem to be
merely declaratory of the common
law rule permitting the trial judge
to use his free discretion as to the
exclusion of witnesses and spectators.
In the application of the court's
right to exclude spectators the majority of courts have held that it
has been within the "inherent
power" of the court to so regulate
admission to the courtroom that
the proper administration of justice
would not be interfered with.
Bloomer v. Bloomer, 197 Wis. 140,
221 N. W. (1928). The court in
Cholia v. Kelty, 155 Ore. 287, 63 P.
(2d) 895 (1937) interpreting this
common law principle said "that
the manner of conducting the trial
rests solely in the sound discretion
of the trial court." Thus, in the
interests of an orderly administration of justice, it has been held,
that when the courtroom is comfortably filled it is not a denial of
a public trial to exclude spectators
by denial of entry to the courtroom. People v. Greeson, 230 Mich.
124, 203 N. W. 141 (1925). Likewise, in one jurisdiction, the prosecuting attorney with the sanction
of the court under an order to exclude, took the names of all spectators of the sane race as the
defendant, and in addition had them
searched for concealed weapons.
apparently to relieve the court of
the possible embarrassment of unexpected violence and gun-play
during the course of the trial.
People v. Mangipane, 219 Mich. 62.
188 N. W. 401 (1922).
But the courts apparently have
also exercised their right to exclude
on the basis of protecting the general public, as well as for the
orderly administration of justice.
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Thus, when there is an influenza
epidemic raging in the community
the court validly exercised its exclusion power when on its own motion
spectators were excluded from the
courtroom in persuance of the
court's police power to protect the
general welfare and the public
health. Likewise, it is generally
said, the court may exclude spectators when the testimony to be heard
will be "vulgar, lewd, or obscene,"
and those in attendance likely to
be present for mere prurient curiosity. Cooley, 1. Const. Lim. 647
(8th ed. 1927); State v. Callahan,
100 Minn. 63, 110 N. W. 342 (1907)
but the court may also exercise its
police power in the interests of a
witness, as well as a spectator; thus
in Commonwealth v. Principatti,
260 Pa. 587, 104 Atl. 53 (1919) it
was held that the court could exclude all other persons of the same
race as the witness on his claim
that he feared reprisals as a result
of the testimony that he was about
to give.
Where the court has abused its
discretion in excluding spectators,
the defendant must, of course, object in the trial court if he wishes
to avail himself of this error' on
appeal. Thus it has been held that
the defendant may, if he so desires.
waive his right to a public trial,
and that he waives the right by
failing to object seasonably to the
exclusion order, or by requesting
the order himself. People v. Swafford, 65 Cal. 223, 3 P. 809 (1894):
Carter v. State, 99 Miss. 435, 54
Sou. 734 (1911): State v. Keeler,
52 Mont. 205, 156 P. 1080 (1916).
In Illinois the Supreme Court in
People v. Harris, 302 Ill. 590. 135
N. E. 75 (1922) held that the right
may be waived, but that it may not
be taken from the accused without
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his consent. Moreover, since the
right to a public trial is guaranteed
the defendant by statutory or Constitutional provision, its denial is
presumed to be prejudicial. State
v. Hensley, 75 Ohio St. 255, 79, N. E.
462, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 277 (1906).
Consequently once the court finds
that a public trial has not been
had it is reversible error, regardless of how clear the defendant's
guilt may be.
The exclusion order of the trial
court in the instant case which
deprived the defendant of a public
trial was unlimited in scope and
was applied to all spectators present, including the defendant's relatives and friends. The majority
opinion makes much of this point
and suggests that if the trial judge
had employed a little discretion and
had "allowed the defendant to retain in the courtroom a reasonable
number of relatives and friends of
his own choosing" that would have
insured him a public trial. This then
brings up the question of how widely the judge may exclude. That the
court may always exclude individuals who are guilty of unruly conduct and boisterous laughter so as
to interfere with the court .and confuse the witnesses is self evident.
Grimmett v. State, 22 Tex. App.
36, 2 S. W. 631 (1886). In one
jurisdiction the court exhibited the
prevailing differences in interpretation of the number excludable,
by holding that the trial judge
cannot widely exclude spectators.
People v. Letoile, 31 Cal. App. 166,
159 P. 1057 (1916), but a year later,
in People v. Tugwell, 32 Cal. App.
520, 163 P. 508 (1917) held an order
to exclude all but fifteen spectators
did. not deprive the defendant of
his right to a public trial. In
Idaho it has been held that the
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exclusion of those persos not necessarily in attendance will not deprive the accused of a public trial.
State v. Johnson, 26 Id. 609, 144 P.
784 (1914). These cases poise the
question also raised by Larsen, J.
in the instant ease, namely, what
number has the defendant a right
to retain? In addition it presents
the problem of how the defendant
shall choose, when the court has
limited the number, between sister
and brother, father or mother, or
close friend and associate. If these
objections are held to bedeterminative it would of course mean that
no order of less than complete exclusion would suffice, for any order
of partial exclusion would bring
up the problem of degree. Apparently, the ultimate solution of this
problem must of necessity he left
to the discretion inherent in the
trial court.
It may be true, of course, that
the very victim of the defendant's
alleged conduct may "suffer such
embarrassment and humiliation as
to cause a mental disintegration on
the witness stand," as the majority
suggests. But, on the other hand,
is it not also conceivable that the
witnesses are more apt to be truthful when confronted with the members of the public in the courtroom,
some of whom may possibly call
attention to their derelictions from
the truth? In all, a sparing use of
the discretionary power to exclude
the public from the courts would
seem advisable, and from a study
of the cases it appears that for the
most part that power has been
carefully regarded by trial courts
and lby reviewing courts on appeal.
FRMMXIK AMMPrIT.
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CORROBORATION AND CICmCMSTANEVImENCE n RAPE CASES.[S. D.] In a recent case, State v.
Husman, 287 N. W. 30 (S. D., 1939)
the defendant was convicted of
rape. The conviction was based on
testimony of the prosecutrix, a
minor, and circumstantial evidence
consisting of certain metal particles,
alleged to have come from the defendant's automobile as it passed
over a rock in the road at the scene
of the crime. The State did not
relate this circumstantial evidence
to the defendant's automobile in
any way. The State Supreme Court
upheld the action of the trial judge
in treating the question of the circumstantial evidence as one con-,
cerning the weight of the evidence,
rather than one concerning its
admissibility, and hence a problem
for the jury.
At common law, a conviction of
rape could be had on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix, if such testimony was not
contradictory, incredible, or inherently improbable. Boddie v. State,
52 Ala. 395 (1875); State v. Rash,
27 S. D. 185, 130 N. W. 91, Ann.
Cas. 1913D 656 (1911); State v.
Dachtler, 43 S. D. 407, 179 N. W.
653, 60 A. L. R. 1131 (1920). By
statute, this rule has been changed
in many states.
Illustrative of the various statutory changes away from the common law rule are Wisconsin, which
requires corroboration where the
prosecutrix' testimony is not most
clear and convincing. Brown v.
State, 127 Wis. 193, 106 N. W. 536,
7 Ann. Cas. 258 (1906); California,
which requires corroboration where
the prosecutrix' chastity is impeachable, People v. Benson, 6 Cal.
221, 65 Am. Dec. 506 (1856); and
Oklahoma, which requires corroboTzLi

ration where the prosecutrix' testimony is obtained through fear,
threats, coercion, or duress. Palmer
v. State, 7 Okla. Cr. 557, 124 P. 928
(1912). The cases in the instant
state, as do a majority of the states,
follow the common law rule that a
conviction for rape may be had on
the uncorroborated testimony of
the prosecutrix. State v. Fehr, 45
S. D. 634, 189 N. W. 942 (1922).
Illinois follows the common law
rule generally, although there is
evidence that the Illinois courts
may require corroboration where
there is a conflict of evidence or
testimony. People v. Polak, 360 Ill.
440, 196 N. E. 513 (1935); People v.
Nelson, 360 Ill. 562, 196 N. E. 726
(1935); People v. Burns, 364 Ill.
49, 4 N. E. (2d) 26 (1936). Also
see 26 J. Crim. L. 463 (1935).
The public policy in these states
which require corroboration of
prosecutrix' testimony to support
a conviction of rape would seem to
look toward the further safeguarding of those against whom this accusation is easily made. In many of
the states which adhere to the common law rule, the purpose of the
rule (requiring corroboration) is
already completely attained by the
trial judge's power to set aside a
verdict upon insufficient evidence.
and under this power, verdicts are
constantly set aside in jurisdictions
having no statutory rule upon the
same evidence which in other jurisdictions would be insufficient under
the statutory rule requiring corroboration. 4 Wigmore, Evidence
(2d ed., 1923) §2061, 378.
Beginning at common law there
has developed in the field of evidence the "Original and Orthodox
Rule," which recites that the erroneous admission or exclusion of
evidence, duly objected to, would
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not be the basis for a new trial
if the rest of the testimony is sufficient to warrant the conclusion
which the jury reached. Rex v.
Ball, R. & R. 132 (1807). State v.

Crawford, 96 Minn. 95, 104 N. W.
822 (1905). An erroneous admission or rejection of a piece of evidence is not a sufficient ground for
setting aside the verdict and ordering a new trial, unless, upon all
the evidence, it appears to the judge
that the truth has thereby not been
reached. Tinkler's case, R. & R.
133 (1781). 1 Wigmore, Evidence,

§21.
As opposed to this Original and
Orthodox rule of evidence, there
developed the so-called "Exchequer
Rule," which regarded errors in
the admission or rejection of testimony as good grounds per se for a
reversal and the granting of a new
trial, irrespective of the nature of
the error. Rutzen v. Farr,4 A. & E.
53 (1835); Wright v. Tatham, 7 A.
& E. 313 (1837); Rex. v. Gibson, 18
Q. B. D. 537 (1887). This rule
viewed evidence as an end in itself,
and meant the automatic reversal
of decisions not procedurally perfect, even though such variances
from the norm were unintentional
and immaterial. The instant jurisdiction adheres to the Orthodox
Rule, and provides for new trials on
evidentiary bases, only when the
substantial rights of the defendant
are prejudiced and when the evidence is insufficient to justify the
verdict. Compiled Laws, S. D. 1929,
§4945. re-enacted in substance in
the S. D. Code of 1939, §34.4002.
not yet in effect when the instant
case was tried.
In the principal case, the dissenting judge spells out in detail the
error that was made by the trial
court in admitting the metal par-
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ticles in evidence. The majority of
the court ignores this aspect of the
case as "undisputed." State v. Husman, supra, at 33. The trial court
considered the bits of metal, found
on a rock in the road near the scene
of the crime eight days after the
crime was committed, and also considered the fact that the distributor
on the defendant's automobile was
broken on the same day; without
further inquiry into the materiality
of the metal particles, or its possible
prejudicial effect on the jury, the
trial judge proceeded with the case,
over the defendant's objection. The
fact that the defendant objected indicates the error of the majority
opinion in treating the question as
"undisputed." The majority opinion never reaches the stage of inquiry as to whether or not this
error made in the court below
should be a ground for reversal.
If inadmissible evidence is admitted, or if improper argument be
made of such a nature that it can
be said that the jury would have
decided substantially the same way
without having seen such inadmissible evidence or heard such improper argument, such error is said
to be harmless. State v. Nelson,
36 Nev. 403, 136 Pac. 377 (1913);
State v. McGrath, 46 S. D. 465, 193
N. W. 60 (1923); State v. Williams,
47 S. D. 68, 196 N. W. 291 (1924);
State v. Keliher, 46 S. D. 484, 194
N. W. 657 (1923). Rex v. Teal, 11 E.
153 (1809). Thus, where there is
sufficient evidence to sustain the
conviction, independently of the
evidence objected to, and admitted,
the admission of such evidence does
not constitute reversible error.
But if there is a substantial
chance that a jury might decide the
other way in a trial conducted
without such erroneously admitted
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evidence, and if it can be said that
such evidence influenced the jury's
decision, as alleged in the principal
case, then a reversal and new trial
should be granted. It is thus the
duty of the court to reverse a conviction where it is based on unsatisfactory evidence, or where
there remains grave and serious
doubt of the guilt of the defendant
such as to lead to the conclusion
that the verdict is the result of passion or prejudice, and not that of
the calm deliberation -that the law
requires. People v. Allen, 279 Ill.
150, 116 N. E. 625 (1917). State v.
Ruhaak, 59 S. D. 636, 241 N. W. 793
(1932); Rex v. Berry, 18 Cr. App.
R. 65 (1924).
In the instant case, the delay of
the sheriff in verifying the defendant's alibi and the sheriff's vague
testhnony in this regard, the questionale statements of the state's
attorney before the jury, the extreme amount of local prejudice
and newspaper comment on account
of which the defendant asked for
a change of venue, which was denied, combine with the defendant's
allegation that the evidence with
reference to the metal particles was
inadmissible, to give support to the
defendant's argument that a new
trial should have been granted.
Whether the accused is prejudiced
by the erroneous admission of evidence at a trial should not be considered abstractly, but the question is mne of practical effect, when
the trial as a whole and all the
circumstances of the case are re-
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garded. Williams v. U. S., 265 F.
625 (1920). In a case with as direct
a conflict of testimony as is presented in the instant case-where
the State's case consisting of testimony of the prosecutrix and a
companion, both minors, was in
direct conflict with the testimony
presented by the defense, and
where the very presence of the
defendant at the scene of the crime,
and even in the county in which the
crime was committed was rebutted
by the host of witnesses <offered by
the defendant--with such a direct
and irreconcilable clash of testimony, no judge in such a situation
can say it was not the consideration
of the metal particles, erroneously
admitted into evidence, which influenced the jury in their attempt
to weigh the scales of justice. Who
can say what effect might have
been produced on the minds of the
jury if they had discovered that the
only corroborative testimony was
testimony that could not be accepted? Rex. v. Berry, supra.
To insist that evidence in a criminal trial be material is not to condone the over-technical Exchequer
Rule of Evidence. To label as "undisputed" that which from the court
record itself was most strongly
"disputed" is to build a judicial decision on an assumption of fantasy.
To deny the defendant in the instant case a new trial based only
on material and competent evidence
is an abuse of judicial discretion
and a gross miscarriage of justice.
GEesGE A. GAUTHIER.

